Monday, December 12, 2011

Ayn Rand & Human Nature 15

Gratitude as social glue. In Out of Character, David Desteno and Piercarlo Valdesolo make the following research-inspired remarks about gratitude:

It seems that just as there are benefits to being fair and trustworthy, so too are there benefits to forging relationships with those we feel we can trust. It's obvious we admire individuals ... who seem honest and who honor responsibilities. These are people we want as partners and friends.When push comes to shove, we need someone who won't sell us down the river to turn a profit. As we've said before, social relationships are a two-way street. These potential partners also need to know the same about us. They need to know that our short-term interest won't always win, that we're in it to share both the profit and the perils. there needs to be some sort of social glue that binds people together.

We believed gratitude functions as just this type of glue. When those warm feelings of gratitude well up inside us, we feel so bounded to others -- at least for the moment -- that we become focused on our collective welfare and willing ... to make sacrifices for the collective good. [166-167]


In this passage the authors of Out of Character make points which Rand and her disciples, because of their strong ideological biases, seem incapable of appreciating. Rand had noticed that there was a sinister side to altruism that had escaped all but the most hard-headed. She then proceeded to denounce all rhetoric that even so much as suggested altruism with a Savonarola-like furor. But in her moral frenzy, Rand lost sight of all the nuances that constitute the reality most of us face in everyday life.


Since human beings are not in fact bundles of premises, as Rand surmised, but creatures with significant motivational baggage, they cannot be inspired to actions most conducive to their long-run well-being on self-interest alone. Long-term and short-term self-interest conflict, tugging the individual in contrary directions. Even worse, decisions are made against a backdrop of varying probabilities and outright uncertainties. Calculations have to be made, often based on little more than educated guesses, as to the probable behavior of other actors and the likely development of unique circumstances. The complexity of many the decisions individuals are forced to make on a day-to-day basis is far too great to be mastered through Randian "reason." The cognitive unconscious must be called in to service to grapple with the complexity. Emotional cues (i.e., messages from the cognitive unconscious) must be taken as part of the data from which decisions are made. Rand's ex cathedra assertion that "emotions are not tools of cognition" has been decisively refuted by the evidence. The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio found that those who, as a result of brain damage, were incapable of responding to emotional cues in decision making, became indecisive and dysfunctional.

There is an element of motivation in all knowledge which eluded Rand, who appeared (at least implicitly) to accept the out-moded view that rational knowledge is achieved through a kind of detached, emotion-free type of reasoning. Knowledge is fundamentally practical; it is gained to achieve a specific practical ends, determined by non-rational motivations. Rand wanted to believe that human motivations were merely the product of premises. Rational premises would lead to "rational" motivations. But this is a view that is both unsupported by the evidence and incoherent in its logic. Rand's view implicitly assumes the existence of unmotivated premises. But since all human action, including the action of thought, must be motivated, motivation would have to precede any acceptance of premises, which means there must have been motivations prior to any premises. Furthermore, anyone with any experience of infants knows that they are motivated long before they are capable of understanding, let alone thinking in terms of, language. Motivations tied to hunger, thirst, and sex are obviously innate; even Rand likely would have accepted this. So why can't motivations involving more complex emotions also have an innate component?

Once it is established that Rand's views on human nature and human motivation are incorrect, Rand's blithe assumptions about the potential rationality of human beings can be challenged and decisively refuted. The failure of Objectivist premises to lead to rationality even among Objectivists themselves demonstrates that individuals don't become rational merely by accepting the premises of rationality. The immaculate rationality preached by Rand is approached, if at all, only by a very few people, and never through Objectivist means. The vast majority of human beings have been and probably always will be influenced to a significant extent by sentiments and emotions. For that reason, if they are to be motivated to behave in a way that promotes happiness and a free and prosperous social order, it may be necessary to appeal to non-rational sentiments and motivational complexes.

Rand's ideal that human relationships be governed entirely by the "trader principle" is based on a mistaken view of human nature. It assumes, against a mountain of contrary evidence, that a rational, enlightened self-interest is in fact possible. But since most human beings are not in fact capable of pursing their interests fairly, impartially, rationally and justly (which is why the law does not allow anyone to be a judge in his own cause), it would appear that a rational outcome can only be approached by maintaining a tenuous balance between egoistic and social sentiments. Human beings need to be concerned for their own interests and welfare, but they also need to be concerned about the interests and welfare of others as well. Gratitude helps maintain this difficult balance. It renders individuals more magnanimous, less prone to nursing private resentments based on overly narcissistic, self-centered judgments. The individual who only attends to his own interests tends to be biased toward his own interests. When he doesn't get his own way, he will tend to become angry and resentful. Instead of focusing on his advantages, he will dwell on his disadvantages. He will become a wet nurse to his own grudges, which will make him ripe to be manipulated by power-hungry demagogues.

While Rand occasionally indulged in sentiments of gratitude toward America, Aristotle, and human achievement, the predominant tone of Objectivism is critical and disparaging. Very little pleased the author of Atlas Shrugged. She might admire the idea of America, but she had little nice to say of contemporary America. She may have admired human achievement in the abstract, but actual achievements often left her cold. She despised or ignored most of the noteworthy achievements of Western literature and Western thought. She does not come off, either in her life or in her philosophy, as a grateful person. The impression she left is that, other than perhaps Aristotle, she owed no intellectual debt to anyone. She often comes off as an angry person, at odds with the world. She had a mania for pronouncing moral judgment, despite the quite obvious fact that, except in rare circumstances, such pronouncements rarely have any beneficial effect, but, on the contrary, are more likely to foster feelings of ill-will and resentment.

The deficiency of gratitude within Objectivism finds its practical exemplification in the anger and contempt that marks the behavior of too many devotees of Rand's philosophy. In a 2006 lecture, Barbara Branden noted: "I find [rage] to be increasingly prevalent among Objectivists. We see everywhere—particularly on the Internet—the spectacle of supposed supporters of reason and free inquiry erupting in fury at the least provocation and hurling abuse at anyone who opposes—even questions—their convictions." Branden traced the origin of this rage back to misapplied premises in Objectivism; but it would be even more plausible to trace this anger back to Rand's own overwhelming disparaging tone and her concomitant mania for moral condemnation, all of which tend to foster sentiments of ingratitude and resentment toward the world at large and render people ungrateful for the advantages they in fact enjoy. In Objectivism, positive assessments are lavished on the purely theoretical. Man in theory is potentially rational and good, but most particular men are horrid mystics of some type or another; the universe in theory is benevolent, but the actual world we live in is an absolute mess teetering on the verge of an apocalypse; America in theory is a great country, but in practice it is almost a fascist state governed almost exclusively by politicians who are either stupid and/or evil. Given Objectivism's general dissatisfaction with the world (a dissatisfaction primarily fueled by allegiance to unrealizable ideals), no wonder Objectivists are so angry. Perfection is the cynic's standard; and the desire for unrealizable ideals only leads to frustration, rage, and ingratitude. It is an acid that dissolves social bonds and leaves the individual isolated from the community. Such isolation is hardly in the individuals "rational" or enlightened self-interest.

46 comments:

Rey said...

Perfection is the cynic's standard...

Oh, don't go lumping Diogenes of Sinope and Crates of Thebes in with the Randroids! Oh, wait. It's lowercase-c "cynic." Carry on. ;)

Xtra Laj said...

LOL @ Rey!

Echo Chamber Escapee said...

@Greg: In Objectivism, positive assessments are lavished on the purely theoretical. Man in theory is potentially rational and good, but most particular men are horrid mystics of some type or another; the universe in theory is benevolent, but the actual world we live in is an absolute mess teetering on the verge of an apocalypse; America in theory is a great country, but in practice it is almost a fascist state governed almost exclusively by politicians who are either stupid and/or evil.

Yep. But don't forget that Rand insisted there was no dichotomy between theory and practice.

Integrate that, if you can. (I can't.)

Rey said...

Here's a laterally OT article called The Austrian Disease--Poor Scholarship, A Prior Bias. The criticisms that the author makes of advocates of the Austrian School of Economics is similar to those this blog's authors make of Rand and her ilk.

gregnyquist said...

The criticisms that the author makes of advocates of the Austrian School of Economics is similar to those this blog's authors make of Rand and her ilk.

While the criticisms in the article and on this blog may be similar in a vague, general sort of way, I nonetheless hope that ARCHN aspires to a higher order of criticism than displayed by Mr. Pilkington in the "Austrian Disease." In the first place, neither Austrian Economics nor Libertarianism are "cults" (or if they are, than Progressivism and Keynsianism must also be cults). Holding eccentric views does not make one a cult. More accurately Libertarianism (as well as the bastardized version of Austrian economics held by Rothbard and the mises.org folks) should be described as an ideology. Objectivism is also an ideology; but only the orthodox brand of Objectivism propagated by Peikoff and ARI can be regarded as a cult. Nor does Mr. Pilkington seem to really understand what actually is wrong with Rothbard's views. He merely plays a game of gotcha, cherry picking one of Rothbard's hyperbolic statement (a statement, moreover, which is not altogether wrong, but merely an exaggeration of an important truth) and then blithely assumes that he can dismiss everything Rothbard and his followers say on the basis of this one statement. It's actually not so easy to refute Rothbard. Rothbard had a more subtle mind than Ayn Rand, and he was much more learned. It takes a bit of work to put one's finger on where he and his mises.org cronies wander off the reservation.

Xtra Laj said...

Greg,

While I am not familiar with any of the broader work of Polanyi and Pilkington that may inform your post, I do find your assessment of Pilkington's entry to be a bit harsh. I do think that Pilkington's assessment of what is wrong with the Rothbardian approach to economics is right. However, I do think that many economists are similarly ideologically limited.

Laj

Neil Parille said...

I thought Pilkinton's post was poor. For example not all libertarians are Austrians and therefore not all believe in praxeology.

While Mises style praxeolgy might seem a little extreme, the basic approach to economic reasoning was main stream until not too long ago.

-NP

Neil Parille said...

While I find Rothbard excessively polemical at times, I don't think you can compare his work (and certainly not Mises and Hayek's) to Rand's and Peikoff's.

Here's is Rothbard's piece that he supposedly "plagiarized" from Rand.

http://mises.org/rothbard/mantle.pdf

Rothbard and other Austrians do try to illustrate their economic reasoning by finding historical examples.

Lloyd Flack said...

What the Austrian economists seem to me to be doing is trying to analyze everything in terms of the actions of individual components of a system and not looking at the properties of the system as a whole. For goodness sake, life itself is just such an emergent property that could not be predicted by looking at the properties of molecules. Consciousness is certainly, at least in part, such a property.

Is it surprising that a society should have properties that cannot be derived from simply looking at the behaviour of individual people. Just because the behaviour of an individual is unpredictable by a mathematical model it not necessarily the case that some aspects of the behaviour of large groups of people will not be usefully described by a mathematical model.

Xtra Laj said...

Greg, Neil,

After re-reading Pilkington's article, I can see why you both hold it in low esteem. I think that my area of agreement with Pilkington's thesis led me to overlook the flaws of the article.

While I agree that Pilkington's analysis of libertarianism is superficial, I cannot but agree with Pilkington that with most libertarians, the conclusion justifies the argument in a very annoying way. Even Neil's pointing out that Austrians use historical analysis is part of the problem - Austrians often selectively analyze history and ignore facts that make their arguments inconvenient. It is the limitations of ideology, agreed, but libertarians can be pretty childish about it.

However, my agreement with that part should not have led me to overlook the superficial understanding of libertarianism and the inability to separate ideologies from cults.

Echo Chamber Escapee said...

Greg and Xtra Laj,

I agree that there is a distinction between ideologies and cults, at least from the organizational perspective. Although I can't imagine a cult without an ideology, cults also involve coercive mind-control tactics, a kind of totalism (the cult dominates all aspects of the member's life), pressure to conform/obey ... none of which are inherent features of ideology. So from the perspective of an organization, it is clearly better to be ideological than cultish. And neither libertarianism nor the Libertarian Party is fairly described as a cult.

But from the perspective of the individual, I'm not convinced the difference between being an ideologue and being a cultist is all that significant. As I see it, ideology is about holding certain ideas "above" reality -- in the sense that the ideologue will distort reality to fit the ideas (whatever they are) rather than revising the ideas to fit the facts. Whether you do this because you're wedded to some set of ideas (libertarianism, objectivism, Marxism, whatever) or because you're in a cult, you are still cutting yourself off from reality.

Francois Tremblay said...

"America in theory is a great country, but in practice it is almost a fascist state governed almost exclusively by politicians who are either stupid and/or evil."

I guess even Ayn Rand can be right twice a day. LOL

gregnyquist said...

As I see it, ideology is about holding certain ideas "above" reality -- in the sense that the ideologue will distort reality to fit the ideas (whatever they are) rather than revising the ideas to fit the facts. Whether you do this because you're wedded to some set of ideas (libertarianism, objectivism, Marxism, whatever) or because you're in a cult, you are still cutting yourself off from reality."

Yes, but not all cutting oneself off from reality is created equal. If individuals lacking political power are cut off from political reality (something likely to be the case with individuals who have no first-hand experience with political power), why is this problem? Since they have no way of implementing their erroneous notions, their lack of realism is without conseqence. Ideology only becomes troublesome when it is used by people in power. And even then, it is often the less false portions of ideologies that are implemented.

Echo Chamber Escapee said...

@Greg: If individuals lacking political power are cut off from political reality (something likely to be the case with individuals who have no first-hand experience with political power), why is this problem? Since they have no way of implementing their erroneous notions, their lack of realism is without conseqence.

I see two problems.

First, it's a problem for the person who is cut off from reality, in the sense that he is impeding his own development as a human being. If he's someone I care about or have to deal with, then it may be a problem for me as well, to whatever extent his ideology gets in the way of my dealing with him.

Second, I wouldn't agree that people who lack first-hand experience of political power are cut off from it. They can vote. A few ideologues here and there (Objectivists, libertarians) probably can't muster enough votes to matter -- but if enough people adopt an ideology (or sufficiently similar ideologies), you can end up with a whole bunch of candidates trying to outdo each other in pandering to the ideologues, as in the Republican Party in the US right now. And that's a problem for the rest of us.

gregnyquist said...

First, it's a problem for the person who is cut off from reality, in the sense that he is impeding his own development as a human being.

I think you are way over-rating the effect that ideology has on most people. Perfectly normal people don't just accept some harmful ideology and then act on it by some kind of accident. If someone accepts a harmful ideology, that's indicative that there's something wrong with those individuals. An ideology is far more of symptom than a cause. Ideologies are primarily rationalizations of sentiments and interests. An ideology may intensify a sentiment, but it does not cause it.

I wouldn't agree that people who lack first-hand experience of political power are cut off from it. They can vote.

The fact that they can vote doesn't mean nearly as much as it is commonly thought. Political communities always are and always have been governed by elites. Elections merely determine which set of elites are selected for some the preeminent positions. People on the left worry about the tea party. But what has the tea party accomplished? The Republicans the tea party helped elect to Congress made a deal with Barack Obama that most tea party people abhor. And lately there were reports that Republicans were going to back down from their no new taxes pledge — also entirely anathema to the tea party. So where's this great influence from the tea party? Even under the assumption that the tea party represents a problem "for the rest of us," (an assumption I'm inclined to doubt), they don't seem to be exercising any practical effect. Michels iron law of oligarchy still holds sway.

KW said...

Greg,

I don't see anything in the quoted passage that would go contra Rand's ideas, except for the last line about making sacrifices for the collective good. It seems to me that this is even a bit of a non sequitur, and thus we should look at what 'warm feelings of gratitude' among people have to do with making 'sacrifices to the collective good'.

I think anyone who understands Objectivism would agree that feelings of gratitude are normal among people who admire and respect each other, and that any 'sacrifice' in this context (as an example I would think of offering a favor or a gift to a friend, because that person and you have a connection that you both value) would be motivated by these feelings of gratitude.

What could we mean by 'sacrifice to the collective good'? As an example, I can think of donating to a charity, volunteering for a humanitarian organization, etc. (in what other way can you offer something of benefit to people beyond your immediate friends?). If this type of 'sacrifice' is motivated by warm feelings, then it's probably because such an action is meaningful to you in a positive way (Rand, with her weird definitons, would not have even called this a "sacrifice"). If it were motivated purely by a notion of unquestionable duty, by that kind of "well, you just have to do it", then warm, fuzzy feelings need not be present.

She then proceeded to denounce all rhetoric that even so much as suggested altruism with a Savonarola-like furor. But in her moral frenzy, Rand lost sight of all the nuances that constitute the reality most of us face in everyday life.

Greg, are you trying to write fiction here? If not, how do you know this? Did you know her personally? This sounds pretty wing-flappingly speculative, contra the 'high-quality scholasticism' you have advocated in previous posts. Your beloved readers might benefit from some evidence for this claim.

gregnyquist said...

I don't see anything in the quoted passage that would go contra Rand's ideas, except for the last line about making sacrifices for the collective good.

I agree that Rand's ideas might be consistent with everything but the last line. But this consistency exists only on a superficial level. It ignores the deeper implications behind Desteno's and Valdesolo's comments. I've attempted to explain this in the post by my comments about motivation and the difficulty most people would have if they attempted to pursue an "enlightened" self-interest. What Rand refuses to acknowledge is that morality is situational, and there may be times (in an emergency or in war, for instance) when the most prudent course would be to make sacrifices for the common good. I don't think it is at all controversial to suggest that Rand herself would denounce any such position if it was rationalized in terms of social virtues. As an example of this, note Rand's utter disdain for the ethical views of Adam Smith. Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, wrote a long defense of social virtues. A quote from that book was included in an edition of The Objectivist as an example of altruism and denounced with the usual Randian furor.

What could we mean by 'sacrifice to the collective good'?

I don't regard this as a useful way of looking at the problem. It's not what "we" mean, it's what the individuals using the phrase mean; and different individuals may mean different things. Moreover, most of the people who use this phrase are not implicating themselves in the extreme form of altruism denounced by Rand. If a soldier dies in defending his country, he has committed an act for the common good. He has, as Lincoln put it, gave his life so "that [the] nation might live." I realize that there are Rand apologists who insist that such acts are self-interested. But this strikes most people as mere casuistry. Since when is giving up one's life so that a "nation might live" a fully self-interested act? In any case, it's unlikely that you could persuade anyone to give up their life in battle solely on egoistic grounds. No general would tell his army that they don't have to make sacrifices, that on the contrary, they should only seek what's in their own self-interest and regard with horror anyone who talks about the common good. Since people are, in general, motivated much more by sentiment than by principle, you have to appeal to their sentiments: to things like patriotrism, the "common good," their manliness, etc. etc.

gregnyquist said...

Greg, are you trying to write fiction here?

I really don't understand what the issue is here. Rand is very quick to equate advocacy of social virtues with altruism. I've already mentioned the case of Adam Smith. But Rand accused the Founding Fathers of accepting the "premise" of altruism. If anyone talked about the "common good" or the "collective good," she would immediately regard that as an expression of altruism.

Now it's important to note that when Rand talks of altruism, she means altruism in the most extreme sense: that is, living exclusively for others; being a mere sacrificial animal to be placed on the alter of the common good. Now neither very few people, regardless of their rhetoric, believe that everyone must live solely for others. Certainly, the Founding Fathers didn't believe that, nor did Adam Smith, nor even did Kant. What most people is that there may be some instances when people may be called upon to make sacrifices for the community at large.

I think anyone who understands Objectivism would agree that feelings of gratitude are normal among people who admire and respect each other

I'm not suggesting that gratitude is antithetical to Objectivism. I'm just noting that Rand did not consider this value important enough to emphasize (it's not in her list of "Objectivist" virtues) and that this a serious omission. I suspect (and psychological research tends to affirm) that gratitude is probably a more important virtue to pursue than "integrity" or even "justice"; that is to say, a grateful person will probably be happier and more at peace with his circumstances than an individual uptight about integrity or "justice." It is easy to find things to be grateful about; and this gratitude, once attained, provides the perspective needed to render justice sensible and integrity humane. But integrity, if pursued with the sort of arrogance often fostered by egoistic philosophies, can easily become an excuse for self-willed eccentricity, while justice, when pursued in the absence of a keen appreciation of the limitations of human nature, easily degenerates into the pursuit of unattainable and therefore utopian ideals.

Lloyd Flack said...

I would suggest that Objectivism unintentionally but predictably encourages ingratitude. It holds up an ideal of a self made man who is completely responsible for his success. With such an ideal of self-reliance there is a strong temptation not to acknowledge the degree to which your success might depend on the help of others and on good fortune. Especially there will be a temptation not to acknowledge help given for altruistic reasons.

I've heard accounts of Rand that claim that gratitude was not her strong suit. I think it is not surprising that gratitude is undervalued in Objectivism.

gregnyquist said...

With such an ideal of self-reliance there is a strong temptation not to acknowledge the degree to which your success might depend on the help of others and on good fortune.

That's one reason which might undercut the development of gratitude among Objectivists. Another is the very high ideals, combined with the mania for judging, which Rand insisted upon. If you're an Objectivist, it's difficult to be pleased with the world around you. Since everything is judged via false and unreasonable ideals, everything is found wanting; hardly the point of view most conducive to feelings of gratitude. How can someone feel grateful if he regards the country he lives in and the people he lives among as stupid, irrational and evil? Feelings of contempt do not provide a fertile soil for the growth of gratitude.

KW said...

Greg,

I apologize for being snarky. I actually failed to read the entirety of your post the first time, as only part of it appears on the front page. Having now read the whole thing, it comes clear to me, in this post more than others I've read, your ability to use subtle exaggerations and misrepresentations of Rand's ideas to further your credo.

Let's look at the soldier in battle example. Many Objectivists I know would phrase the problem like so: you face an alternative between defending your country, or living under a rule/regime/system which is much less favorable than what you have before the war. Entering battle does not mean certain death, but does carry a significant risk to life. It is up to the individual to decide wether the benefits of winning the battle outweigh this risk.

Is this the right way to look at the problem? The most logically sound and the one that considers all necessary parameters? Maybe it isn't, but it's certainly different than the Objectivist viewpoint that you tend to project.

As for the virtue of gratitude, again, from my experience, Objectivists would place this under the virtue of justice. They would say justice entails both punishing the so-called "bad" and rewarding the so-called "good." This reward could take the form of acknowledgement or praise, even down to a simple, personal level. Your friends are, by definition, people who you like, so why not express these feelings through appropriate gestures? Even the less significant people in your life, the person who bags your groceries, or the person who cleans your office, offer something of "value" to you, and thus acknowleding this with a polite gesture or a thank-you is perfectly appropriate.

Again, is this the One True way to look at it? Maybe not, but it's certainly different than the way you think Objectivists think.

You have to keep in mind that there are many types of Objectivists out there. Some are highly rationalistic, acting on certain principles with a kind of dogmatic furor, and often taking certain ideas highly out of proportion to the greater context (I've heard anectdotally about a guy who refused to give his girlfriend a cigarette unless she paid him for it). On the other hand, there are those who are more down to earth, and to whom Objectivism as an entire system of ideas matters more than clinging onto a few select components.

While there may be an academic arena for criticism of Objectivism, this would require a long and thorough study of the meanings of its ideas, and what sort of results these ideas lead to when deployed in real life. Unfortunately, Greg, what I've seen from you thus far is more of an agenda approach, particularly with what I would call your almost narrative personification of Rand's character (she did this, she though that), for which you provide little or no evidence. Rather than a neutral approach to the study of Objectivism, this indicates that your starting point was probably a long-standing beef with Objectivism, Ayn Rand, or both, and that you've thereafter tried to bend as much evidence as you can in your direction.

Xtra Laj said...

KW starts with:

I apologize for being snarky.

and then moments later, writes:

Having now read the whole thing, it comes clear to me, in this post more than others I've read, your ability to use subtle exaggerations and misrepresentations of Rand's ideas to further your credo.

Why apologize then if you're going to be snarky all over again?

Laj

Xtra Laj said...

Greg wrote:

If a soldier dies in defending his country, he has committed an act for the common good. He has, as Lincoln put it, gave his life so "that [the] nation might live." I realize that there are Rand apologists who insist that such acts are self-interested. But this strikes most people as mere casuistry. Since when is giving up one's life so that a "nation might live" a fully self-interested act? In any case, it's unlikely that you could persuade anyone to give up their life in battle solely on egoistic grounds. No general would tell his army that they don't have to make sacrifices, that on the contrary, they should only seek what's in their own self-interest and regard with horror anyone who talks about the common good.


KW wrote:

Let's look at the soldier in battle example. Many Objectivists I know would phrase the problem like so: you face an alternative between defending your country, or living under a rule/regime/system which is much less favorable than what you have before the war. Entering battle does not mean certain death, but does carry a significant risk to life. It is up to the individual to decide wether the benefits of winning the battle outweigh this risk.

KW, the alternative Greg discussed was dying in order to further the lives of your fellow soldiers vs. preserving your life and allowing more likely multiple injuries and deaths to others. It was not about possibly rational calculations about whether to defend your country, which are different. What rational calculation do you make that makes such a decision to commit suicide while saving others self-interested? And is such a rational calculation really how an Objectivist thinks about it?

Or do you simply think that dying to save fellow soldiers is an abominably altruistic act?

CW said...

"Many Objectivists I know would phrase the problem like so: you face an alternative between defending your country, or living under a rule/regime/system which is much less favorable than what you have before the war."

For a great number of internationally-deployed soldiers this alternative has not existed since, oh, at least WWII. Even 9/11 and the worst plans of terrorists are not a serious threat to the US regime/system. If anything, such acts only shore it up, causing people to put aside differences "for the common good".

Another motive could be seen as a warped sort of altruism: revenge for the victims.

"your ability to use subtle exaggerations and misrepresentations of Rand's ideas"

If Greg is wrong for stating that "Rand thought X", aren't you equally as wrong to declare a misrepresentation, that "Rand did not think X"? Your own evidence, as presented here, is less compelling than his.

gregnyquist said...

While there may be an academic arena for criticism of Objectivism, this would require a long and thorough study of the meanings of its ideas

There may be an academic arena for criticism? You're not sure about this? Here's the reality of the situation: if someone gains notoriety for making controversial claims, that individual will be criticized, if not by academics, then by people outside of academia. That's just the way it is. The day when Ayn Rand and Objectivism cease to be criticized is the day when they will have ceased to have so much as a jot of relevance.

what I've seen from you thus far is more of an agenda approach, particularly with what I would call your almost narrative personification of Rand's character (she did this, she though that), for which you provide little or no evidence.

And do you have any evidence for this claim? In the post above I ascribe to Rand the following: (1) she believed that human beings are "bundles of premises"; (2) she intensely denounced altruism; (3) Rand wanted to believe that human emotions were the product of premises; (4) Rand would likely have accepted that hunger and thirst are innate; (5) Rand assumed that all men had the potential to be rational; (6) Rand left the impression that she owed no intellectual debt to anyone other than Aristotle. Now none of these are all that controversial about Rand, except perhaps the last (which is based on a declaration Rand made during a Q&A, where she declared she owned no intellectual debt to anyone other than Aristotle). I don't cite sources on Rand when I consider them fairly uncontroversial. I've discussed on this blog a great many times Rand's views on human nature, and have even sometimes quoted the relevant sources. If you think something is amiss, simply inquire about the specific claim. I can't evaluate vague charges that don't cite examples.

this indicates that your starting point was probably a long-standing beef with Objectivism

Either I'm right about Rand's theory of human nature or I'm not right. Speculation about my motives from someone who knows virtually nothing about me is entirely irrelevant to the issue at hand. It is a question of fact, not of personal motives.

gregnyquist said...

Is this the right way to look at the problem? The most logically sound and the one that considers all necessary parameters? Maybe it isn't, but it's certainly different than the Objectivist viewpoint that you tend to project

And what viewpoint have I projected? In this post, I didn't even criticize the theory of altruism in Objectivism. This is post about human nature, criticizing Rand's view that human beings have the potential to be rational. Now if most human beings are not capable of the type of rationality Rand supposed, all these theoretical niceties that you bring up are irrelevant. If most people cannot pursue their self-interest in a "rational" and enlightened way; if most soldiers cannot be convinced to risk their lives on rational self-interest grounds; in that case, it matters little whether you can make, in theory, a rational case that dying in battle is consistent with self-interest. This post is about motivation, not the Objectivist theory of altruism or what Objectivists think about dying in battle. Some disagreeable functions (such as fighting in war) must be performed to keep a society free. The question is: how do you motivate people to do those acts? I'm suggesting that using Objectivism as a tool of motivation would probably lead, in most if not all cases, to failure.

fotografia ślubna said...

perfect article, :)

KW said...

Why apologize then if you're going to be snarky all over again?

I was referring more to the overall tone of my inital post.

the alternative Greg discussed was dying in order to further the lives of your fellow soldiers vs. preserving your life and allowing more likely multiple injuries and deaths to others.

Are there any real life situations that pose such a rigidly binary alternative?

Even 9/11 and the worst plans of terrorists are not a serious threat to the US regime/system.

Not anymore. And the wars that these events start aren't big enough to call for compulsory drafting. Every soldier fights there because he chooses to.

If Greg is wrong for stating that "Rand thought X", aren't you equally as wrong to declare a misrepresentation, that "Rand did not think X"? Your own evidence, as presented here, is less compelling than his.

The way that I'm aware it works in science is that if you assert the positive claim, you need to provide the evidence. If you tell me that aliens abducted your auntie, it's not my obligation to prove that this wasn't the case. Why can't we adopt the same rules here? Greg makes positive assertions without providing compelling evidence.

There may be an academic arena for criticism? You're not sure about this?

I'm not sure. I'd like to see someone begin from a neutral starting point, and with the calm, academic tone of many of the 'great thinkers' referenced in this blog, take a real hard look at Objectivist ideas.

if someone gains notoriety for making controversial claims, that individual will be criticized

While this may be true, it's pretty vague, and doesn't really justify the specific case of your criticism of Ayn Rand.

And do you have any evidence for this claim?

I gave an example in my first post of what I thought sounded like fictional narrative.

Now if most human beings are not capable of the type of rationality Rand supposed, all these theoretical niceties that you bring up are irrelevant.

This is, I think, the satement of the central pillar in your critique against Rand, the notion that humans are not capable of Randian 'rationality,' that reality, in it's entirety, is too complicated to be understood by human consciousness. Coming from someone who claims to be a seeker of truth, this assertion is surprising. It's like saying that truth isn't fully reachable by the human mind. This kind of vague notion that "reality is too complex" or that "human beings aren't really capable of.." (I mean vague in the sense that where do you define the limit that the human mind is capable of reaching?) is not only useless, it's self-defeating. Truly astonishing that you go to such painstaking lengths to defend it.

It is a question of fact, not of personal motives.

You write a post about how human beings are "creatures with significant motivational baggage" and the implausibility of Rand's idea of a "detached, emotion-free type of reasoning" and yet you go on to assert your own detached, rational objectivity in your whole approach. Nobody with an unbiased view toward Ayn Rand writes an entire book and then five years worth of lengthy blog essays scathingly trying to criticize her ideas. You assert yourself that Rand was a "sloppy and even maladroit thinker." There was another post (I believe it was by el sidekick, Daniel) about looking at the numbers and how small Ayn Rand's influence has been on America at large. You're a brillant writer, Greg, and you seem to know a lot about philosophy. Such a narrow focus on something to which you don't ascribe much significance is indicative of some kind of strange and sad obsession.

Lloyd Flack said...

I hope I'm not putting words into Greg's mouth but but I think his point is that we have only partial awareness of what is going on in our minds.

Greg is i think not being sufficiently precise when he uses the term consiousness. The way I see it there are at least three aspects of consciousness. There is awareness, the actual subjective representation in the mind of external reality. There is emotion. And there is self-awareness, the part which monitors what some of the rest of the mind is doing. Sometimes when people talk about consciousnes thaey mean all three processes and sometimes they only mean the last. Self-awareness only has acess to part of what the mind is doing. Believing otherwise was one of Rand's biggest mistakes.

Francois Tremblay said...

"Self-awareness only has access to part of what the mind is doing."

If by "part," you mean an almost infinitesimally small portion, then yes. The level of access we have of our brain is more or less, analogically, the equivalent of how much knowledge the CEO of General Motors has about the precise actions of any specific person working in a GM factory somewhere- fuck all except at the level of utmost generalities, which are often false or delusions.

Lloyd Flack said...

I was not singling Greg out. Most people are a bit vague about just what they men by consciousness. Rand definitely was.

Just as most people are vague about what they mean by life. Most of the time when they are talking about human life they are actually talking about the operation of human consciousness. Not the same thing at all. Rand actually had more of an inkling of this than most people.

CW said...

"The way that I'm aware it works in science is that if you assert the positive claim, you need to provide the evidence. If you tell me that aliens abducted your auntie, it's not my obligation to prove that this wasn't the case. Why can't we adopt the same rules here? Greg makes positive assertions without providing compelling evidence."

Well, you're both making essentially positive assertions: "Rand thought this" vs. "Rand thought that" (which happens to be "not this"). It's more like "aliens abducted my auntie" vs. "dinosaurs abducted your auntie". Furthermore, you're making this claim based on an implication that you know better than Greg what Rand's thought processes were like - which from my perspective may or may not be true, but Greg has years' worth of blog posts here for reference and support of his position, and as yet, your evidence is "I don't have to directly refute someone's positive claim in order to declare it invalid".

Daniel Barnes said...

KW:
>I'm not sure. I'd like to see someone begin from a neutral starting point, and with the calm, academic tone of many of the 'great thinkers' referenced in this blog, take a real hard look at Objectivist ideas.

KW,
1) There is no such thing as a "neutral starting point." Such things are irrelevant. You can be firmly in favour of Rand, and have great arguments. You can be firmly against her, and have terrible arguments. And vice versa.
The main problem is that her followers, and Rand herself, tend to have terrible arguments. If they didn't, we'd probably be in favour of her!

2) If "tone" is the biggest bone you have to pick with the ARCHNblog, then we must be doing pretty good. Point out areas where we are factually wrong, or have made serious logical errors, and you will have made an important criticism - and we would welcome it. I would even argue that your criticism of our "tone" is misguided. Given the generally hysterical tone of pro and anti Rand commentary, I think the ARCHNblog is pretty moderate usually. Also never forget that Rand wrote in a highly provocative way herself, and there is nothing "calm, academic" or even "neutral" in her style, which is polemical if not occasionally hysterical itself. Yet I don't hear you demanding that same standard from Rand, but only her critics. Why not?

>Such a narrow focus on something to which you don't ascribe much significance is indicative of some kind of strange and sad obsession.

Once again, if your best criticism is feeble attempts at psychologising like this, we must be doing alright. Rand is a significant cultural figure; this is obvious. Yet she lacks much in the way substantial, detailed criticism, certainly compared to the efforts her various institutes and legion of internet fanboys to build her intellectual reputation. Usually such criticism comes in the form of the odd hit piece from the left that tends to focus on her personal life and attributes, which only leaves her fans more convinced that her philosophy is somehow supremely unanswerable. It isn't. It's actually a very weak, and even hazardous intellectual contribution, with a handful of useful things in amongst it - most of which are available in far better packages elsewhere.

This asymmetry between her fame, which attracts uncritical, sycophantic fans who swallow her romantic notions warts and all, and the searching empirical and logical criticism her philosophy actually needs is what we try to provide here in our own small way. So now you know.

Xtra Laj said...

Are there any real life situations that pose such a rigidly binary alternative?

Volunteers for Suicide missions where death is near certain? Falling upon a grenade to save your comrades? Why is it in your selfish interest to fall on it and not someone else?

Anonymous said...

I think to really get Ayn Rand, one has to have lived in an openly corrupt society, which America isn't. I lived in Nigeria for seven years, and one of the things that amazed me was how the "collective culture" of the people, prevented them from rallying against an openly corrupt government.

I mean on one side, it was amazing to see how much respect the young had for the old, but on the other hand it was amazing to see the consequences of that, which is that older people are rarely ever challenged by the younger generation, so bad ideas just get carried on from one generation to the next.

Xtra Laj said...

I think to really get Ayn Rand, one has to have lived in an openly corrupt society, which America isn't. I lived in Nigeria for seven years, and one of the things that amazed me was how the "collective culture" of the people, prevented them from rallying against an openly corrupt government.

I lived in Nigeria for way more than seven years and while I have relatives who agree with Rand, I find that people can superimpose her ideology onto any situation they wish because they aren't seriously testing it. There are Marxists who are equally convinced that Marx explains Nigeria well too. Ideology does that to you.

Apart from what I believe is the major problem with Nigeria, which is that I don't believe the intellectual capital currently exists to sustain a modern economy for more than 10-20% of its population, I think Lee Kuan Yew said in one sentence something that explains the Nigerian condition far more than anything Ayn Rand ever wrote, as she denounced tribalism, but never explained why almost all her serious associates were Jews:

"SPIEGEL: During your career, you have kept your distance from Western style democracy. Are you still convinced that an authoritarian system is the future for Asia?
Mr. Lee: Why should I be against democracy? The British came here, never gave me democracy, except when they were about to leave. But I cannot run my system based on their rules. I have to amend it to fit my people's position. In multiracial societies, you don't vote in accordance with your economic interests and social interests, you vote in accordance with race and religion. Supposing I'd run their system here, Malays would vote for Muslims, Indians would vote for Indians, Chinese would vote for Chinese. I would have a constant clash in my Parliament which cannot be resolved because the Chinese majority would always overrule them. So I found a formula that changes that..."

That is an empirically testable statement and often explains voting patterns in many multi-ethnic countries.


I mean on one side, it was amazing to see how much respect the young had for the old, but on the other hand it was amazing to see the consequences of that, which is that older people are rarely ever challenged by the younger generation, so bad ideas just get carried on from one generation to the next.

Is it the ability to evaluate the ideas that is lacking, or the will to do so, or both? Could you provide a specific example?

Younger people defer to older people all the time in just about every culture across the world. I think we need to be sure that we are comparing apples to apples here.

One of the limitations of the human mind is that it can see cause and effect where there is only correlation, and it can claim correlation when what is really going on is cause and effect. Finally, it is hard to tie cause to effect without eliminating other possibilities. I am not saying you are wrong, but would like to know how seriously you have investigated the matter of Nigeria's corruption in terms of theories other than Objectivism.

gregnyquist said...

This is, I think, the satement of the central pillar in your critique against Rand, the notion that humans are not capable of Randian 'rationality,' that reality, in it's entirety, is too complicated to be understood by human consciousness.

This is close to my position, but it's not quite exact. I wouldn't say, for example, that reality, "in its entirety, is too complicated to be understood by human consciousness." Understanding reality "in its entirety" is not important. Human beings do not have to understood, and are not wired to understand, all of reality. Human beings only need to understand what is needed for the well-being of themselves, their loved ones, and the social order they live in. The way I would put it is as follows: Some aspects of reality which are important to human well-being are too complex to be understood via conscious reasoning. To this I would add a further proviso: Most (not necessarily all) people are not capable of thinking rationally about abstract moral and political doctrines, but rather use bad arguments to defend whatever accords to their sentiments (which tend to be inflexible). These views are backed by extensive research by experiment psychologists and cognitive scientists. (The best single book on this topic is the soon-to-be-released The Righteous Mind, which provides detailed descriptions of the evidence for the limits of human rationality.)

It's like saying that truth isn't fully reachable by the human mind.

That's your own interpretation, or rather misinterpretation, of my position. It's boilerplate Objectivism: anyone who challenges Rand's view of reason is denying the efficacy of the human mind.

This kind of vague notion that "reality is too complex" or that "human beings aren't really capable of.." (I mean vague in the sense that where do you define the limit that the human mind is capable of reaching?)

I've discussed these issues extensively in past blog posts, particularly in my series "The Cognitive Revolution & Objectivism." It's not a vague notion at all for those who have read and understand those posts as well as the books referenced therin. See my post on "Reason and Emotion" for a detailed description of why conscious reason, on its own sources alone, can't handle complexity.

gregnyquist said...

You write a post about how human beings are "creatures with significant motivational baggage" and the implausibility of Rand's idea of a "detached, emotion-free type of reasoning" and yet you go on to assert your own detached, rational objectivity in your whole approach.

It was actually my concern about rationality that led me to Ayn Rand in the first place. Initially, Rand seemed like a passionate, eloquent defender of rationality and realism. Yet on closer acquaintance I kept running into in things in Rand's philosophy and life and in the Objectivist movement that didn't seem either rational or realistic. This was a initially baffling: how could someone who was so passionately in favor of rationality and realism so often lapse into their opposites? This was something that had to be explained, so I became a critic of Rand and her philosophy. This criticism has provided a motive for studying human nature, and arriving at the important truths which Rand misrepresented or ignored.

From a larger perspective, Rand's provides a cautionary example of how it is to stray from the narrow path of rationality. Rand appears to have been completely ignorant of the unconscious forces that were leading her astray. Her view of human nature made it impossible for her to understand, let alone come to grips with or control, those unconscious forces.. If you get human nature wrong, you will never understand how rationality can be achieved. Rand never provided an adequate technology for "reason" because she didn't understand the psychological forces involved. Most individual reasoning is mere rationalization; as Jonathan Haidt puts it, conscious reasoning is "mostly post-hoc constructions made up on the fly, crafted to advance one or more strategic objectives." Rationality only emerges in a social context through criticism. Human beings are congenitally bad at criticizing themselves, but they are often very good at criticizing others. So while the individual may struggle to be rational (because he is hopelessly biased on behalf of himself, his kin, and whatever group and/or ideology he identifies with), within a group of scientists or scholars, he may achieve a functional rationality via peer review. In short, evidence from experimental psychology corroborates Karl Popper's view of rationality, not Rand's.

KW said...

I kept running into in things in Rand's philosophy and life and in the Objectivist movement that didn't seem either rational or realistic.

I've heard this notion a lot from 'ex-Objectivists' but none have ever provided a specific example.

KW said...

Most (not necessarily all) people are not capable of thinking rationally about abstract moral and political doctrines, but rather use bad arguments to defend whatever accords to their sentiments (which tend to be inflexible).

A bit of a self-description there? If that's the case, how can you prove to us that you're not one of the "most" people?

Echo Chamber Escapee said...

@KW:

You quoted Greg:

I kept running into in things in Rand's philosophy and life and in the Objectivist movement that didn't seem either rational or realistic.

and replied:

I've heard this notion a lot from 'ex-Objectivists' but none have ever provided a specific example.

Actually, Greg has provided many specific examples. As you know, his main thesis on this blog (and in his book) is that Rand was fundamentally unrealistic about human nature. More specifically, her ideas about the origin of emotions and the role of reason in decision-making are deeply flawed, and evidence to that effect is mounting as psychological research advances. Greg has been demonstrating, repeatedly, how the research undermines Rand's views.

But you seem to deny that any of this rises to "specific examples." So I'm wondering if what you are looking for is more in the form of a detailed line-by-line critique of Randian arguments.

If so, then here is one: a detailed critique by Michael Huemer of Rand's essay "The Objectivist Ethics." He identifies numerous specific factual and logical errors in the essay.

Chief among the errors Huemer identifies are these two:

1) Rand's claim that that "the functions of all living organisms ... are actions generated by the organism itself and directed to a mingle goal: the maintenance of the organism's life" is factually false, i.e., not realistic.

2) Rand's switch from physical survival as the standard of value for non-human organisms to "man qua man" survival as the standard for human beings is logically indefensible, i.e., not rational.

Hard to get more specific than this. And FWIW, I've never seen a convincing refutation of Huemer's analysis by any Objectivist.

KW said...

psychologising like this

I never speculated about the nature and origin of Greg's motives. Those are irrelevant. What matters whether there is a strong negative motivation against Rand or not.

Echo Chamber Inhabitant,

The way Greg describes it is is that he began to 'see' things firsthand in Objectivism that, to him, just didn't fit with the rest of the system. This is what I was asking for, not just "Hey! Check out this ... criticism that's posted on the internet!"

I've never seen a convincing refutation of Huemer's analysis by any Objectivist.

I don't see why any Objectivist would take the time to write one. With any set of complicated, abstract ideas, pretty much anyone is capable of taking those ideas and craftily twisiting them into an interpretation of his own choosing. Taking the time to refute one of these would be in vain because another could pop up anywhere at any time. Objectivism is not immune to being misconstrued.

CW said...

"I don't see why any Objectivist would take the time to write one."

Sure, why bother to clarify or explain Rand's concepts to the unconvinced? Better to just lock ranks and declare Objectivism perfect. That'll guarantee that everyone sees the light.

"With any set of complicated, abstract ideas, pretty much anyone is capable of taking those ideas and craftily twisiting them into an interpretation of his own choosing."

Such as how Rand twisted the ideas of Kant, or Hume's is/ought problem?

...Or even you and this blog?

Daniel Barnes said...

KW:
>I never speculated about the nature and origin of Greg's motives. Those are irrelevant. What matters whether there is a strong negative motivation against Rand or not.

Actually, here's what you wrote:
KW:"Such a narrow focus on something to which [Greg N doesn't] ascribe much significance is indicative of some kind of strange and sad obsession."

And here you go again: "What matters is whether there is a strong negative motivation against Rand or not."

Actually, even if you did have a strong negative motivation against Rand, which we don't, once again this is irrelevant to the quality of the arguments. You can like Rand and have great arguments, you can hate her and have terrible ones, and vice versa. The fact that I may hate Socrates doesn't stop "All men are mortal/Socrates is a man/Socrates is mortal" being a valid argument. What is it about this Argument 101 that you don't understand?

KW:
>I don't see why any Objectivist would take the time to write [a refutation of Huemer].

So hilarious. Objectivists could fly to the moon too, or solve nuclear fusion using Rand's epistemology; they just don't feel like doing it right now. Why don't you give it a crack, KW, seeing you've probably read Atlas Shrugged and everything. Isn't that all you need to know to refute every philosophic critic ever?

Actually, the reason why Objectivists don't refute critics like Huemer is because for the most part they are embarrassingly bad at making arguments in the first place. Of course, they will have no doubt learned nothing from reading Rand, as she has hardly any arguments at all, let alone good ones. Most of her work consists of freestyle assertions, word games, inflammatory rhetoric and lots of juicy denunciations. That's all, folks. And that's why her fanbase, particularly online, consists largely of Miss Malaprops like KW who don't know the difference between "scholarship" and "scholasticism" let alone what "psychologising" is even when they use the term themselves.

So now you know that accusations of "bias" are just lame, KW, do you have any other point you'd like to make? Or is that it?

KW said...

Better to just lock ranks and declare Objectivism perfect.

I'm not sure if it is, but I find Objectivism interesting and thus I've started to study it a little.

Such as how Rand twisted the ideas of Kant, or Hume's is/ought problem?

Just because everyone is capable of twisting ideas doesn't make it a necessary outcome. That's something that you, and presumably others here believe, and I'll probably look into at some point.

What is it about this Argument 101 that you don't understand?

Daniel, you forget that Greg is trying to convice us that we can't escape our "motivational baggage" when we make our arguments. It seems to me that he's implying that there is no such thing as a "good" stand-alone argument because it had to have come from someone possessing motivations. This seems to give me a ticket to say what I was saying.

Miss Malaprops like KW

Juvenile name calling isn't going to help you, Daniel. Did someone say high-quality scholarship?

don't know the difference between "scholarship" and "scholasticism"

So because I made a slip and got a word wrong it goes toward invalidating my points? But your guys' motivations don't affect your points?

So, in the end, I took a quick look at Huemer's page. Let's look at how he starts off:

In Objection (i), he does a pretty good job of outlining what Objectivism calls the 'subjective-intrinsic' split, but then he attributes Rand's position to the former. However, the notion that Objectivism belongs in a third category apart from these two is explained here:(http://objectivism101.com/Lectures/Lecture29.shtml)

In Objection (ii), I can't, for the life of me, envision a situation in which you can "in no way avoid" receiving a certain sum of money. If someone grabs your hand and stuffs money into it, you can let go of it a second later. If he stuffs it down your throat, the money gets destroyed. I don't see where Huemer gets this idea.

Now, I haven't looked at the rest, but right at the beginning, he's made one significant misunderstanding, and presented an impossible hypothetical situation to further his point. Given that he's constructing an argument, and not a decorative piece of wooden furniture, any mistakes he makes are not going to enhance the final product by giving it more character, They're going to weaken it significantly.

Daniel Barnes said...

KW:
>Daniel, you forget that Greg is trying to convice us that we can't escape our "motivational baggage" when we make our arguments. It seems to me that he's implying that there is no such thing as a "good" stand-alone argument because it had to have come from someone possessing motivations. This seems to give me a ticket to say what I was saying.


Well, KW, you'd be dead wrong. Here's why. Yes, we humans have "motivational baggage". Now, equipped with said motivational baggage I will make a good argument:
P1:All men are mortal.
P2:Socrates is a man.
C: Socrates is mortal.
Yes, that just happened! I just did the very thing you claim we're "implying" is impossible. Even with my "motivational baggage" I made a good argument.

Look, it seems you're deeply confused about what Greg is saying. Let me spell it out. Greg criticises Rand's theory of human nature because it does not fit the facts - for example, that her "blank slate" conception doesn't account for the large amount of "motivational baggage" we're born with. However, just because you, me, Greg, Ayn Rand all have this inbuilt baggage it does not necessarily follow that all our arguments are therefore no good. My example above now demonstrates this.

Are you starting to get it now?